Project Document Format for non-CPAP Countries or Projects outside a CPAP

United Nations Development Programme
Country: Cyprus

Project Title: Support to High Level Decision-Making in the Cyprus Peace Process

CP Outcome: Climate for Reconciliation Improved

Output (s):

1. South African negotiating experience shared with the two Cypriot Leaderships

Executing Entity: UNDP
Implementing Agency: In Transformation Initiative

Brief Description

This project is a component of the UNDP ACT-CCE programme approved by LPAC on 8 October 2013. It responds to the programme objective outlined under output 1 of the ACT-CCE mandate: **Civic and political leaders engaged in a genuine track 2 processes in Cyprus.** In this regard the project will draw upon the specific expertise and reputation of leading figures who helped to negotiate the end of Apartheid in South Africa. The project will leverage this expertise at specific moments during the ongoing Cyprus peace talks to help break deadlocks in the negotiation process. It will also provide high level guidance (drawn from the South African experience) to the conduct of civic forums designed to democtratise the peace process and engage civic leaders and civil society representatives in grass roots reconciliation and support to the high level negotiations. The project will seek to ensure a meaningful and sustained Track II process, which incorporates representatives of the wider Cypriot society, ensuring that the voices and concerns of ordinary Cypriots are heard by the peace negotiators and incorporated in the decisions regarding a settlement.

Programme Period: 2013-2015	Total resources required: **100,000 USD**
Key Result Area (Strategic Plan) _____	Total allocated resources:
Atlas Award ID: _____	• Regular 0
Start date: 1 January 2014	• Other:
End Date 30 September 2015	o USAID **85,000 USD**
PAC Meeting Date	o UNDP (11888) **15,000**
Management Arrangements Direct Execution	

Agreed by (UNDP)

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I.   SITUATION ANALYSIS

A. Background

Peace negotiations to resolve the Cyprus conflict were re-launched in 2008, following the failure of the Annan Plan to garner public support in both Cypriot communities in 2004. Since then substantive talks between the leaders of the Greek Cypriot Community (GCC) and Turkish Cypriot Community (TCC) have taken place in the context of a Cypriot-led and Cypriot-owned process. Progress has been made but a comprehensive settlement has not been reached. During this time there has been one change in leadership in both communities. In 2008 Mr. Dimitris Christofias on the GCC and Mr. Mehmet Ali Talat of the TCC started negotiations with great fanfare and optimism for the future. In spite of the progress made in successfully closing several chapters of the negotiating process, a settlement plan was not produced. In 2010 Mr. Dervis Eroglu was elected leader of the Turkish Cypriot community and in spite of several high level efforts, including two meetings with the UN Secretary-General in New York, the two leaders were unable to reach agreement on a peace plan. In February 2013 Mr. Nicos Anastasiades was elected leader of the Greek Cypriot community. Anastasiades' immediate priority was to manage a banking crisis and wider economic decline in the GCC, and thus negotiations made little progress from April to October 2013.

The role of the UN Good Offices Mission has been significant over the entire period since 2008, and though the peace process is Cypriot-led, the international community has continued to play an instrumental role. Since March 2013, Special Advisor for the Secretary General, Alexander Downer has pursued a path towards re-launching fully-fledged negotiations, and specific events have been engineered to help bring the leaders together in the spirit of developing trust between the negotiating parties. The need for confidence building measures has long been a characteristic of the peace process, and a mechanism for formalizing CBMs was created through Technical Committees in 2008. The committees were designed to develop confidence building measures that could improve the lives of the average Cypriot as well as the atmosphere of the peace talks. In reality, the committees allowed the two communities to discuss key issues at a semi-official level and to concretely demonstrate that the two communities can work together. The seven technical committees focus on crime and criminal matters, economic and commercial matters, cultural heritage, crisis management, humanitarian matters, health, and the environment. UNDP-ACT provided technical and financial support to the committees which allowed for eight leader-approved CBMs to be implemented. In addition UNDP supported other CBMs outside of the peace process which proved important in paving the way for increased contact between the communities. In August 2013 the Mr. Anastasiades, and his Foreign Minister, Ioannis Kasoulides, raised the issue of the "return of Varosha" as a CBM which could pave the way for a successful "holistic or diagonal" negotiation to conclude a Cyprus settlement. The Turkish Cypriot leadership maintains a position that the issue of Varosha can only be addressed in the context of a territorial adjustment within a comprehensive settlement to the Cyprus problem.

On 15 August 2013 Mr. Dervish Eroğlu sent a letter to Mr. Nicos Anastasiades about the resumption of the talks. Mr. Eroğlu asked the Greek Cypriot leader to "clarify" his positions on the convergences contained in the 30 April 2013 document (known as the Downer document, which contained all the convergences secured between 2008-2010) provided by the United Nations. Eroğlu argued that since he had accepted what his predecessor Mr. Mehmet Ali Talat agreed in the negotiations process, Anastasiades should do the same and accept what had been agreed between Eroğlu and former Greek Cypriot leader Mr. Demetris Christofias. The Greek Cypriot side publicly rejected the idea that the "Downer Document"

constituted a definitive starting point for the negotiations as it believed it reserved the right to re-negotiate any issues on the basis of the maxim that "nothing is agreed to everything is agreed".

The divergence of opinion inherent in the positions taken by the two sides, and exemplified by the disagreements on Varosha and the Downer Document, continues to characterize the preparations for the resumption of Talks. As of January 2014 the failure to agree a Joint Declaration, which has been a Greek Cypriot pre-condition for fully-fledged negotiations, contextualizes the challenges associated with finding a common vision for the political future of the island. The process to agree the Joint Declaration started in September 2013 and by December the major facets of the statement had been agreed except the crucial issue of the nature of "sovereignty" in a united Cyprus. The rejection by one side or the other of various formulations of the "sovereignty" issue, has exposed the most fundamental and deep-seated fears that both sides have of each other. Greek Cypriot negotiators fear that the Turkish Cypriot emphasis of the equality of two sovereign peoples in one state will later open up the possibility that the Turkish Cypriot community will secede from a united Cyprus. On the other hand the Turkish Cypriot leadership fears Greek Cypriot domination in a single united state. The inability to garner a mutually reflective political culture which instils confidence in the intentions of the "other" community continues to hold back the negotiators from taking the bold steps towards a settlement.

II. STRATEGY

D. Programme Objectives and theory of change

The project strategy aims to address the deep level of mistrust in the high level negotiating process. Mistrust amongst the main protagonists is fundamental and is founded on historical evidence, and is thus not purely a perceptual problem. Currently the most divisive core issues which remain unresolved concern the constitutional framework, governance and power-sharing, territorial adjustments, return of displaced people, property, security and Turkish Settlers. Reaching consensus on these will require heightening the degree of trust between the negotiating teams and the two leaders. In this regard, the project will seek to guide and support the negotiators in the process of developing trust through the exposure to the process lessons which emerged from the exercise to dismantle Apartheid in South Africa. A large part of this will involve the process of demonstrating how the African National Congress (ANC) and the National Party were able to overcome their mutual mistrust, including the courageous steps taken by the respective leaders, in order to change the political dimensions in South Africa.

Exposure to lessons from the South African negotiating process (Action 1.1)

The first intervention under the project is scheduled for the first quarter of 2014 and will involve a visit by the Cyprus negotiators to South Africa. Since 1994 South Africans have been quite willing to share their own experience with countries in conflict, without trying to prescribe solutions; instead the sharing of experience has focussed on tried and tested principles, strategies and tactics used by both sides in the South African process to ensure that a lasting political solution could be found. Over the years this sharing process has been executed by bringing the leaderships involved in various conflicts (e.g. Northern Island, Sri

Lanka, South Sudan and Bahrain) to South Africa to engage with the personal stories and experiences of the peace process and its unfolding dynamics.

In this context this project will bring the key negotiators from both sides of the Cyprus divide to South Africa for an "exposure" visit of 4-5 days with a view to meet numerous individuals and groupings that were part of the peace-making process in South Africa. The visit will also be used as an opportunity to pass on South Africans' practical knowledge of the role of civic forums in peacemaking to the Cypriot negotiators, while a team from UNDP-ACT-CCE, which was asked to design a civic forum for Cyprus, will make up a part of the Cypriot delegation. During the visit the Cypriot delegation will have meetings with at least 15 different South Africans, directly involved in the South Africa peace making process. These will be individuals from a wide range of political parties, business and unions, academics, the media and constitutional experts as well as religious and civil society leaders and entities. The delegation will possibly visit important political landmarks such as Robben Island, the Apartheid museum as well as freedom Park. Many of the meetings will be in formats of one to one, small workshop groupings and working dinners. Some meetings will be conducted in a manner where the delegation is split to allow one on one consultation though most will be done in a joint format.

The intention is that the Cypriot negotiators will benefit from their engagement with South Africans, leading to the emergence of new ideas and approaches that might have a direct positive impact on the way they conduct the future talks and peace process in Cyprus.

Follow up to Negotiators' visit (Action 1.2 and 1.3)

Subsequent actions will seek to build on the momentum created by the Cyprus negotiators' visit to South Africa and aim to provide continuous impetus to the learning experience by involving other important stakeholders involved in reconciliation; civic leaders and political party representatives. In this context, two visits will be scheduled.

Firstly, a 3-day visit of senior South African civic leaders to Cyprus will aim to bring together South African and Cypriot civic leaders to share comparative experiences in efforts towards reconciliation. The visit is envisaged to be a building block towards renewing approaches to reconciliation among Cypriot civic leadership with the aim of drawing from the practical knowledge and experience of their South African counterparts. Through workshops and roundtable discussions the group will draw from comparative experience in both contexts and analyse and compare various conflict resolution mechanisms that could be used in the Cyprus context. The series of workshops are envisaged to help Cypriot civic leaders build a more pragmatic vision for a post-settlement Cyprus that could lead to the development of a set of considerations or commitment for actions.

Further to the above, a 4-day study tour of a delegation of Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot political party representatives to South Africa is also scheduled. The aim of the visit is to expose political party representatives to South Africa's experience of civic leadership in reconciliation. This is envisaged to facilitate the exploration of new approaches towards inclusion in the Cyprus peace process. As instrumental actors in the Cyprus peace process with the potential to facilitate and support a wider, more inclusive peace process, political party representatives will be exposed to South African peace process and the lessons learned in conflict resolution. This can begin to shape a deeper understanding of the dynamics of conflict transformation and of the various approaches and peace building tools employed in promoting inclusivity in South Africa. Similar to the negotiators visit to South Africa, the Cyprus political party representatives will have the opportunity to meet and

engage in discussions with a wide range of key individuals involved in South Africa's transition to democracy. In addition to these discussions a number of cultural visits will be made to deepen the participants' understanding of the political and cultural context of South Africa's transition.

Building on UNDP-ACT's work to support the Cyprus peace process

Three main reasons underpin the rationale for the Cyprus Negotiators' visit to South Africa:

1. Exposure to other negotiating styles and successful approaches to unravelling political stalemates.
2. Educate the negotiators and the UNDP Cyprus team of the value and benefit of civic forums in peace making processes.
3. Generate an impetus for follow up activities which could be complementary to the formal negotiations, and which provide the official negotiators another outlet for seeking impartial and trusted expert advice.

These three objectives reflect UNDP-ACT's community-based efforts to support the Cyprus peace process and comes at a crucial stage as the two sides attempt to navigate a route through the last obstacle (the Joint Declaration) to full-blown negotiations. The project builds on work which was successfully completed by UNDP-ACT in 2013, which resulted in an agreement with the major Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot political parties on the need for civic forums which would run parallel to the formal peace negotiations. On 4 December 2013 political party representatives gave UNDP-ACT a mandate to design a process to facilitate broad-based civic dialogues across the island which could formalise public engagement with the peace negotiations. In this endeavour UNDP-ACT was assisted by South Africa's former chief government negotiator with the ANC in the early 1990s, Mr. Roelf Meyer, who facilitated the political representatives meeting which led to the decision to create a Cyprus civic forum to complement the peace negotiations. Senior representatives of the two negotiating teams immediately welcomed this development.

The political parties' decision came as a result of UNDP-ACT's year long dialogue with business, political and civic leaders from Cyprus, culminating in a high level workshop in Malta from the 18 to 20 September 2013. Supported under the UNDP-ACT "Participatory Peace Making Project", the Malta workshop brought together 60 Cypriot civic, business and political figures to discuss the following question: "How can an inclusive approach help the Cyprus Peace Process"? Participants were introduced to examples of peace processes which accommodated the participation of different sectors of society from South Africa, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Northern Ireland.

Facilitated by former senior peace negotiators from South Africa and Northern Ireland the political and civic leaders dialogue concluded that there was a need to increase levels of public hope in the peace process, build a stronger feeling of public ownership of the peace process and increase the transparency of the peace process. Following Malta the political parties requested UNDP-ACT to continue to facilitate meetings in Cyprus to further develop a vision for a more inclusive peace process.

The sub-project fits within the first output of the ACT-CCE programme, which was approved by LPAC in October 2013, and will support the overall objective to improve the quality of the peacemaking process in Cyprus.

Output from ACT-CCE programme document	Beneficiaries and Partners	Intended Results
Civic and political leaders engaged in a genuine track 2 processes in Cyprus	• The Leaders of the two communities and their negotiating teams • An inter-communal Cypriot civil society sector • Political party representatives, business leaders and other influential civic leaders.	A meaningful and sustained Track II process, which incorporates representatives of the wider Cypriot society, ensuring that the voices and concerns of ordinary Cypriots are heard by the peace negotiators and incorporated in the decisions regarding a settlement.

III.   RESULTS AND RESOURCES FRAMEWORK

Intended Outcome as stated in the Country Programme Results and Resource Framework:

Climate for Reconciliation Improved

Outcome indicators as stated in the Country Programme Results and Resources Framework, including baseline and targets:

Indicator: Trust between negotiating teams improved

Baseline 2013	Target 2014	Target 2015
Lack of trust demonstrated in public statements that deflect responsibility and place blame with other community	Public statements begin to highlight positive steps (however small)	Public statements begin to champion a common vision

Applicable Key Result Area:

Partnership Strategy

INTENDED OUTPUTS	OUTPUT TARGETS FOR (2014)	INDICATIVE ACTIVITIES	RESPONSIBLE PARTIES	INPUTS US$
Output 1: South African negotiating experience shared with the two Cypriot Leaderships	1. Improved understanding by the two Cypriot negotiating teams of: • Challenges and opportunities inherent in a peace and transition process	**Activity 1: High level dialogue between Cypriot negotiators and former South Africa negotiators conducted.** **Action 1.1:** Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot negotiators visit South Africa for exposure visit.	In Transformation Initiative	Action 1.1 40,000 USD

	• Different models of governmental devolution and decentralisation;	**Action 1.2:** Cypriot civic leaders produce a vision a post-settlement Cyprus.		Action 1.2 20,000 USD
	2. Recommendations from civic forums communicated to negotiating teams.	**Action 1.3**: Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot political party representatives conduct a study tour in South Africa to learn about the South African experience of civic leadership in reconciliation.		Action 1.3 40,000 USD

IV. MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

a) Mixed implementation modality

This project will follow the direct execution modality of UNDP, as per the "Blanket authorization for new and future projects of the Cyprus programme funded by the EU and USAID", communicated on 9 December 2005 and the LPAC approval for the ACT-CCE programme on 1 October 2013. However, as has been the practice since 2009 UNDP will adopt an NGO implementation modality since the identified NGO partner possesses a unique set of skills and experience by virtue of the personnel which will lead the project implementation.

b) The nature of implementation

Given the political underpinnings of this project, the management arrangements will need to remain highly flexible. For the most part the timing of activities undertaken will require good political judgement from UNDP and the implementing partner, in collaboration with the UN Good Offices and other international actors which are investing in the negotiation process. Senior Cypriot negotiators have expressed an interest in learning from the South Africa experience, and utilising this as a means to add quality to the negotiation process.

c) Profile and unique expertise: In Transformation Initiative

The *In Transformation Initiative* aims to promote the principles of the South African peace making model in different conflict situations in South Africa, Africa and around the World. The organisation has already engaged with senior Cypriot negotiating figures, independently and in association with UNDP-ACT's *Participatory Peacemaking project*. From this perspective the organisation has already created a working relationship with key Cypriot decision-makers which would provide an opportunity to support the project's programme goals.

Its Directors and its Patron have individually and collectively worked in areas of conflict and transition for over twenty years and with this, they bring a wealth of experience that has been called upon by governments, international organizations and individuals throughout the world. This extensive experience has been called upon to assist in Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Yemen, South Sudan, Iraq, the Basque region in Spain, Bahrain, the Naga question in India, while numerous other engagements have included academic interactions and work with political actors throughout the globe. The founding Directors and Patron were prominent actors in the strategy, the discussions, and the negotiations that eventually led to the peaceful transition to democracy in South Africa. Their direct involvement in the South African transition and the lessons learnt from this experience helped develop skills that are regularly called upon to assist in areas of the globe that are experiencing conflict or are in the process of transition. The *"In Transformation Initiative"* establishes an institutional base for this collective experience and skill set.

Roelf Meyer (ITI Director) practiced as a lawyer in Pretoria and Johannesburg before permanently entering politics as a Member of Parliament in 1979. He resigned from active politics after 21 years at the end of January 2000. During this period he served as Deputy Minister of Law and Order and subsequently of Constitutional Development (1968-1991) and Cabinet Minister of Defence and subsequently of Constitutional Affairs (1991-1996). Roelf Meyer was intimately involved in the negotiations on the settlement of the South African conflict as Chief Negotiator for the National Party Government. It was in this capacity that he negotiated the end of apartheid together with Cyril Ramaphosa who was Chief Negotiator for the African National Congress

(ANC). These negotiations resulted in the first democratic elections in South Africa at the end of April 1994. After the election Meyer continued in the portfolio of Constitutional Affairs in the Cabinet of former President Nelson Mandela.

Mohammed Bhabha (ITI Director) practiced as a lawyer in Mpumalanga after which he was apointed by the ANC to the South African Senate in 1994 and elected as the Chairman of the Select Committee on Provincial Affairs, Local Government, Constitutional Affairs and Provincial Administration. During this time he became a member of the negotiating team of the African National Congress during the constitution making process. He led the negotiations on the Chapter on Local Government of the Constitution,

Ivor Jenkins (ITI Director) was a minister of religion and during this time became an anti-apartheid activist. He spent the last 30 years in organising, managing and leading civic and civil society organisations of which most of this time was spent with Idasa – the institute for democracy in South Africa. He has played an important role in South African and African politics using his political facilitation skills to assist in the transformation in a myriad of sectors including, political leadership, inter group relations, conflict management, governance systems transformation, organizational development, NGO capacity building, project management and fundraising.

Ebrahim Ebrahim (ITI Patron) is Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation in the Government of South Africa. He joined the liberation movement as a youth activist in 1952 and participated in the Congress of the People Campaign, which adopted the Freedom Charter in 1955. In 1961 he joined the armed wing of the ANC, Umkhonto Wesizwe after the banning of the ANC. He was arrested and charged under the Sabotaga Act with 18 others in the Pietermaritzburg sabotage trail in 1961 and he was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment at Robben Island. He was released in 1979. He was banned and his movements restricted to his home town Durban; and in 1980, he went to exile on instruction of the ANC. He served as a member of the Joint Select Committee on Intelligence and he was the Senior Political and Economic Advisor to the Deputy President as well as to the president of South Africa. He was a member of Parliament from 1994 to 2002 and he was a Chairperson of the Parliamentary Portfolio on Foreign Affairs Committee in 1994. Mr Ebrahim was involved in conflict resolution efforts between Israel and Palestine, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo as well as in Burundi, Kosovo, Bolivia and Nepal from 2002. He became a Political Advisor in 2002 and was appointed as Head of International Affairs at the ANC Head Office in 2006. In 2008 he became Deputy Minister of International Affairs and Co-operation.

Project Organisation Structure

Proiect Board

Senior Beneficiary Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot negotiators	**Executive** UNDP (RBEC)	**Senior Supplier** UNDP/USAID

Project Assurance UNDP-ACT

Project Manager In Transformation Initiative

Project Support UNDP-ACT PMU

V. MONITORING FRAMEWORK AND EVALUATION

In accordance with the programming policies and procedures outlined in the UNDP User Guide, the project will be monitored through the following:

Within the annual cycle

➢ On a quarterly basis, a quality assessment shall record progress towards the completion of key results, based on quality criteria and methods captured in the Quality Management table below.

➢ An Issue Log shall be activated in Atlas and updated by the Project Manager to facilitate tracking and resolution of potential problems or requests for change.

➢ Based on the initial risk analysis submitted a risk log shall be activated in Atlas and regularly updated by reviewing the external environment that may affect the project implementation.

➢ A project Lesson-learned log shall be activated and regularly updated to ensure on-going learning and adaptation within the organization, and to facilitate the preparation of the Lessons-learned Report at the end of the project

Annually

➢ **Annual Review Report**. An Annual Review Report shall be prepared by the Project Manager and shared with the Project Board and the Outcome Board. As minimum requirement, the Annual Review Report shall consist of the Atlas standard format for the QPR covering the whole year with updated information for each above element of the QPR as well as a summary of results achieved against pre-defined annual targets at the output level.

➢ **Annual Project Review**. Based on the above report, an annual project review shall be conducted during the fourth quarter of the year or soon after, to assess the performance of the project and appraise the Annual Work Plan (AWP) for the following year. In the last year, this review will be a final assessment. This review is driven by the Project Board and may involve other stakeholders as required. It shall focus on the extent to which progress is being made towards outputs, and that these remain aligned to appropriate outcomes.

Evaluation

➢ UNDP and USAID have agreed to conduct 1 outcome evaluation during the project cycle. This will be scheduled for the 2rd quarter of 2015. The evaluation will focus on the CCE programme and assess if its mandate succeeded in building on the success of the previous ACT programme.

VI. LEGAL CONTEXT

The project document shall be the instrument envisaged in the [Supplemental Provisions](#) to the Project Document, attached hereto.

Consistent with the above Supplemental Provisions, the responsibility for the safety and security of the executing agency and its personnel and property, and of UNDP's property in the executing agency's custody, rests with the executing agency.

The executing agency shall:

a) put in place an appropriate security plan and maintain the security plan, taking into account the security situation in the country where the project is being carried;

b) assume all risks and liabilities related to the executing agency's security, and the full implementation of the security plan.

UNDP reserves the right to verify whether such a plan is in place, and to suggest modifications to the plan when necessary. Failure to maintain and implement an appropriate security plan as required hereunder shall be deemed a breach of this agreement.

The executing agency agrees to undertake all reasonable efforts to ensure that none of the UNDP funds received pursuant to the Project Document are used to provide support to individuals or entities associated with terrorism and that the recipients of any amounts provided by UNDP hereunder do not appear on the list maintained by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999). The list can be accessed via http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267ListEng.htm. This provision must be included in all sub-contracts or sub-agreements entered into under this Project Document.

VII. ANNEXES

OFFLINE RISK LOG

Project Title: Crossroads for Civic Engagement		Award ID:		Date: 1 January 2014

#	Description	Date Identified	Type	Impact & Probability	Countermeasures / Mngt response	Owner	Submitted / updated	Last Update	Status
1	Peace Process fails, or yields very limited dividends.	1 August 2011	Political	P=3 I=4	• Dialogue with the authorities and astute management will support morale among partners and staff.	Programme Manager	1 August 2013	N/A	Normal
2	Lack of Interest or enthusiasm from the Cyprus negotiators	1 January 2014	Organizational/	P=2 I=4	• The high level nature of the South African partner, the work conducted in 2013 and the existing political relations between the ITI team and key people in the Cyprus negotiating teams limits the likelihood of this risk.	Programme Manager	1 January 2014	N/A	Normal
3	The Authorities oppose the project.	1 January 2014	Political	P=2 I=4	• UNDP-ACTs work with the authorities over the past 12 months regarding "Track 2" approaches has been well received and senior officials in both authorities' have embraced the idea of learning from the South Africa experience	Programme Manager	1 January 2014	N/A	Normal